Diplomats & Admirals: The Origins of the Pacific War
Diplomats & Admirals by Dale A. Jenkins (Aubrey Publishing Co., New York, 2022) offers a fresh perspective on one of the most studied periods of World War Two, focusing particularly on the diplomatic manoeuvring that preceded the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States. Jenkins, a former U.S. Navy officer with extensive experience in the Pacific region and later careers in international banking and Council on Foreign Relations, brings both military and diplomatic insights to this compelling story.
The book’s greatest strength lies in its detailed examination of the diplomatic efforts to prevent war in the Pacific. Jenkins meticulously documents the complex web of personalities, policies, and missed opportunities that ultimately led to conflict. His portrayal of key figures such as Japan’s Prince Konoe, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, and US Secretary of State Cordell Hull reveals how personal ambition and rigid thinking often trumped rational diplomacy. Particularly telling is his description of Matsuoka, who “was interested, not in promoting the interests of Japan, but rather those of Matsuoka Yosuke,” and who was willing to “gamble the future of Japan and its seventy-seven million people” for his own political advancement.
Jenkins presents several fascinating “what-if” scenarios where war might have been avoided. One particularly striking example involves the Dutch East Indies oil negotiations, where Jenkins suggests that “willingness to allow a modest flow of oil could have precluded the Japanese invasions” and potentially removed the threat of Japanese economic collapse that drove them toward war.
The book’s treatment of the military aspects of the conflict, while competent, covers more familiar ground. However, Jenkins still manages to provide interesting insights, particularly in his analysis of the Japanese naval leadership’s persistent attachment to battleship warfare despite the rising dominance of aircraft carriers in naval engagements. This is notably illustrated in his discussion of Admiral Yamamoto’s planning for the Battle of Midway, where “despite his development of the carrier force, its unprecedented attack on Pearl Harbor (sic), and its victories in the south Pacific and Indian Ocean prior to Midway, Yamamoto compulsively remained a battleship admiral.”
One of the book’s most valuable contributions is its examination of the communication failures between different branches of government and military services. A prime example is Jenkins’ observation that Hull’s diplomatic stonewalling tactics stemmed partly from “the mistaken belief that in a war with Japan US forces would prevail in a few months,” noting that “taking five minutes to talk with Admiral Stark on the power of the Japanese navy never occurred to him.”
The narrative is strengthened by Jenkins’ ability to weave together the personal, political, and military aspects of the story. His background in both naval service and international affairs allows him to provide nuanced analysis of both the diplomatic scheming and military operations.
Today, it is easy to forget that back in 1941, Japan possessed the world’s most powerful navy and some of the most advanced aircraft. As Jenkins notes, the Japanese had developed “carrier operations and armaments that were, at that time, the most advanced in the world,” including the highly manoeuvrable Mitsubishi A6M Zero long range fighter. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy was struggling with obsolete equipment - Jenkins points out that “in the early months of the war, the US Pacific Fleet was hampered by obsolete torpedo planes and hopelessly ineffective World War I torpedoes.” The fact that American naval forces managed to achieve victory at Midway despite these disadvantages makes their triumph even more remarkable and a testament to the courage of their pilots.
Diplomats & Admirals serves as both a fascinating historical account and a cautionary tale, demonstrating how personal ambition, institutional rigidity and failures of communication can lead nations into unnecessary conflict. Many readers, even those familiar with the Pacific War, might be surprised by Jenkins’ revelations about the missed opportunities for peace and the tragic consequences that followed. This well researched work is a valuable addition to the literature on the Second World War, offering insights into the complex, often murky diplomatic negotiations that preceded a conflict which would ultimately cost 25 million lives.
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Image Attribution:
Wikipedia.org: An Imperial Japanese Navy Mitsubishi A6M2 “Zero” fighter on the aircraft carrier Akagi during the Pearl Harbor attack mission. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor#/media/File:A6M2_on_carrier_Akagi_1941.jpeg
Wikipedia.org: Secretary of State Cordell Hull (1887–1955) brought Japanese Ambassador Kichisaburō Nomura (1877–1964, left) and Special Envoy Saburō Kurusu (1886–1954, right) to the White House for a meeting with President Franklin Roosevelt (1882-1945) on 17 November 1941. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cordell_Hull#/media/File:Hull,_Nomura_and_Kurusu_on_7_December_1941.jpg
Wikipedia.org: U.S. Navy Torpedo Squadron 6 (VT-6) Douglas TBD-1 Devastator aircraft are prepared for launching aboard the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CV-6) at about 0730-0740 hrs, 4 June 1942, Battle of Midway. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Midway#/media/File:Douglas_TBD-1_Devastators_of_VT-6_are_spotted_for_launch_aboard_USS_Enterprise_(CV-6)_on_4_June_1942_(80-G-41686).jpg
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