The Silent Disaster: How Communication Failures Helped Doom Operation Market Garden

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Operation Market Garden: 17 to 25 September 1944

As we commemorate Operation Market Garden this September, it's worth reflecting on one of the most ambitious - and ultimately ill-fated - military operations of World War II. Launched in September 1944, Operation Market Garden aimed to secure a series of nine bridges in the Netherlands, potentially paving the way for a swift advance into Germany. It was a massive undertaking, involving over 34,000 airborne troops and 50,000 ground forces. Yet, what began with high hopes ended in a costly failure, partly because of a communications breakdown.

At the heart of Market Garden's communication crisis was the inadequacy of the radio equipment. The British Army's standard radio set, the Wireless Set No. 22, proved insufficient for the task at hand. These radios had a maximum range of around six miles under ideal conditions, yet the Corps Headquarters was positioned a distant 15 miles away. To compound matters, the terrain around Arnhem presented additional challenges that the planners had failed to fully account for. The Arnhem area was characterised by woodland and urban buildings. These physical obstacles severely interfered with radio transmissions, further diminishing the already limited range of the No.22 sets. As a result, what should have been a vital lifeline for the paratroopers of the 1st Airborne Division fighting desperately to hold the north side of the bridge at Arnhem became a silent witness to their isolation and eventual defeat.

Interestingly, a potential solution to these communication problems was literally at hand. The Netherlands boasted an extensive and sophisticated telephone network, largely intact despite years of German occupation. This network was remarkably resilient, comprising three interconnected systems: the national Ryks Telefoon system, the Gelderland Provincial Electricity Board's private network, and a clandestine network operated by Resistance technicians. Even when key exchanges were disrupted, the Dutch were still able to communicate using alternative routings.

Yet, astonishingly, Allied planners failed to fully leverage this resource. This oversight raises profound questions about the rigidity of military thinking. Why did the Allied command, known for its adaptability in other areas, fail to pivot to this seemingly obvious solution? The answer likely lies in a combination of factors: overconfidence in existing systems, security concerns, lack of familiarity with local infrastructure, the fast-paced nature of the operation, and a wariness of the Dutch Resistance.

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British XXX Corps cross the road bridge at Nijmegen

The consequences of this failure were dire. While some units made limited use of the phone system, the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem - where the need was most critical - did not. They made no attempt to convey their urgent need for supplies or relief via the phone system to the corps headquarters. Ironically, Dutch agents inside the 82nd Airborne's landing area used the phone system early on D+1 to inform the 82nd that “the Germans are winning over the British at Arnhem” - the first indication that the 1st Airborne was in serious trouble.

In the face of radio failures, the Allied forces resorted to various other communication methods, each with its own limitations. Carrier pigeons proved unreliable, with many birds failing to deliver messages. Traditional forms of communication like land lines, runners, and dispatch riders were vulnerable to enemy fire and the chaos of battle. The artillery net ended up being one of the more reliable communication methods, allowing for effective artillery support and occasional relay of messages to higher command.

The communication failures during Operation Market Garden offer valuable insights into military organisational thinking. They underscore the importance of flexibility, the need to understand and potentially leverage local infrastructure, the crucial role of contingency planning, and the necessity of fostering a culture that encourages quick problem-solving and innovative thinking at all levels of command.

It's worth noting the contrast between the German military's mission-type tactics (Auftragstaktik), which emphasized flexibility and initiative, and the British Army's reliance on detailed orders and strict adherence to commands. This difference in command styles meant that German forces could often exploit opportunities more rapidly, while British forces maintained tighter control but at the cost of agility.

As we reflect on the events of eighty years ago, it's clear that the lessons learned extend far beyond the realm of military strategy. In any high-stakes endeavour, the ability to communicate effectively - and to adapt when primary methods fail - can mean the difference between success and catastrophic failure. The underutilisation of the Dutch phone system stands as a poignant example of how overlooking available resources can have far-reaching consequences.

The story of Operation Market Garden serves as a stark reminder of the critical role that effective communication plays not just in military operations, but in any complex undertaking. It's a lesson that remains relevant today, in fields ranging from business to disaster response. As we face our own challenges in an increasingly connected world, let's not forget the silent disaster that unfolded in Holland eighty years ago - and the valuable lessons it still has to teach us.

References

1. Middlebrook, M. (1994). Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle. Westview Press.

2. Ryan, C. (1974). A Bridge Too Far. Simon & Schuster.

3. Kershaw, R. (1990). It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem, September 1944. Ian Allan Publishing.

4. Buckley, J. (2013). Monty's Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe. Yale University Press.

5. Beevor, A. (2018). The Battle of Arnhem: The Deadliest Airborne Operation of World War II. Viking.

6. Powell, G. (1992). The Devil's Birthday: The Bridges to Arnhem 1944. Leo Cooper.

7. Badsey, S. (1993). Arnhem 1944: Operation Market Garden. Osprey Publishing.

8. Hastings, M. (2004). Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945. Alfred A. Knopf.

9. Zaloga, S. J. (2014). Operation Market-Garden 1944 (1): The American Airborne Missions. Osprey Publishing.

10. Clark, L. (2008). Arnhem: Operation Market Garden, September 1944. Sutton Publishing.

11. MacDonald, C. B. (1963). The Siegfried Line Campaign. Center of Military History, United States Army.

12. Bennett, D. (2007). Airborne Communications in Market Garden, September 1944. Canadian Military History, 16(1), 41-42.

13. Greenacre, J. W. (2004). Assessing the Reasons for Failure: 1st British Airborne Division Signal Communications during Operation 'Market Garden'. Defence Studies, 4(3), 283-308. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1470243042000344777#d1e290

Billy Bishop Goes To War

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Jermyn Street Theatre, 16b Jermyn Street, London SW1Y 6ST

Wednesday 31 October – Saturday 24 November 2018

Coinciding with the centenary of the end of World War I, Proud Haddock is reviving Billy Bishop Goes To War as part of their War Season and Jermyn Street Theatre’s Rebels Season. This striking drama is based upon the true story of young Billy Bishop, a failing military college student who became Canada’s indomitable flying ace, the most successful pilot of his generation.

Billy Bishop Goes To War will star Charles Aitken (The Knick, Cinemax; Happy Death Day, Universal Pictures; King Lear, Royal Shakespeare Company) as Billy Bishop with Oliver Beamish (Coronation Street, ITV; Blood Brothers, Lyric Theatre; War Horse, The New London Theatre) as the Older Billy Bishop, who will also provide the piano and musical accompaniment. Between them, they will play a further 17 parts as they recount this extraordinary tale.

In 1914, Billy Bishop, aged only 20, signed up to fight in the Great War. A failing and bullied student, he overcame intense prejudice and astonishing danger to receive his wings and become the top fighter pilot. Through a combination of bravery and sheer luck, Billy was able to find his place and prove his worth. He became a true Canadian hero.

Brought to life with songs of the period, Billy Bishop Goes To War vividly transports the audience across the landscape of World War I, from the thick mud of No Man’s Land to the drawing rooms of the British aristocracy. This compelling and darkly comic drama interrogates the nature of heroism and its cost while shining a light on the often-neglected complexities of Britain’s colonial past during the War.

Written by John MacLachlan Gray in collaboration with Eric Peterson, the play returns to London for the first time in over 35 years. Billy Bishop Goes To War is the deceptively moving and totally gripping account of one man’s life in World War I.

Director Jimmy Walters comments, Proud Haddock’s War Season continues with Billy Bishop Goes To War. This is a true story with lots of heart. Billy wasn’t the most academic student, was bullied at school and faced prejudice when he arrived in England during the First World War yet he overcame all of this to become the greatest fighter pilot of his generation. It’s an inspiring story that is a privilege to revive.

For more information download a copy of this press release.

To book ticket visit http://www.jermynstreettheatre.co.uk/. The play runs between Wednesday 31October and Saturday 24 November, 2018.

The German War: Crimes and Persecution Complex

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The German War by Nicholas Stargardt and The Bitter Taste of Victory by Lara Feigel are two history books that neatly dovetail with one another. The German War examines the many, varied aspects of the German war experience from 1939 to 1945 at home and on the frontlines. The Bitter Taste of Victory begins in 1944 as Allied forces, East and West, advance into the shrinking Reich and extends to 1949. Both books focus heavily on the question of German guilt for the many crimes committed under the Nazi regime, remorse and reconstruction. Chillingly, each book comes to the same conclusion: the only thing the surviving Germans truly felt guilty about was losing the war. The only pity most Germans felt was self-pity. Her cities, centres of industry and infrastructure lay in ruins. Millions were displaced and homeless. Hunger, disease, and lack of winter fuel all contributed to the misery after the nation’s collapse.  However, for the victims of the camps, the millions of slave labourers, and all those countries ravaged by the German war machine there was no thought, no compassion and no sense of national guilt or shame. On the contrary, population surveys taken 5 and 10 years after the war revealed German sentiment towards the Jews and many Nazi policies had barely changed for many.

The German War examines the many motivating factors that kept the German people fighting right until the bitter end, even when defeat was assured. It reveals how most Germans initially believed they were fighting a war of national defence against Poland, France and Great Britain. Later, the Allied air offensive convinced many Germans of their victimhood, although some saw it as a punishment for their crimes against the Jews. The book also exposes the lie that most Germans were ignorant of the many atrocities committed by the regime. In fact, right from the start of the conflict German soldiers were documenting their crimes in writing, photography and film. But perhaps one of the darkest aspects of the book is just how quickly ordinary men and women could be transformed from law-abiding citizens to brutal murderers and rapists. The transformation often took less than two months. In Russia, senior field commanders began to worry about their troop’s propensity to loot property, burn villages and slaughter the inhabitants without orders. When defeat and occupation finally came to the German nation it did nothing to change outlooks and attitudes. Even years after the war’s end, the majority of Germans believed that Nazism had essentially been a good idea, poorly executed.  

Lara Feigel’s book The Bitter Taste of Victory begins in the closing months of the war, as reporters, writers, filmmakers and entertainers followed the advancing Allied armies into the heart of Nazi Germany. The book illustrates the utter destruction wrought on German cities by the Allied bombing campaign and contrasts it with the horrors of death and concentration camps such as Bergen-Belsen. Martha Gellhorn, Marlene Dietrich, Billy Wilder and George Orwell are just some of the famous names we encounter amidst the rubble and misery of Germany’s defeat. With incredible naivety, the occupying powers set about a process of denazification. Writers, artists, musicians and filmmakers were recruited to cleanse German culture of its Faustian excesses. However, German re-education, the Nuremberg Trials and occupation seem to have done nothing to change the population’s psyche. Instead, the realpolitik of the Cold War allowed former Nazis and war criminals to reinvent themselves without actually changing. Rather than accept any collective guilt, the Germans of the war period were satisfied to largely remain silent or seek refuge in empty platitudes and point the finger of blame anywhere but at themselves. There is some small irony that far-left-wing groups such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang would later regard the West German state as the continuation of fascism and imperialism by other means.

In reality, these two books arrive at the same stark conclusion, although starting from very different places. The Germans of the war years remained fixed in their beliefs that they were victims, not perpetrators. They largely believed Nazism was correct in its outlook, but poorly executed by the regime. That brutality, murder, and even genocide were justifiable in pursuit of national goals. These two books also illustrate just how quickly the most civilised and educated of people can be transformed into remorseless killers, happy to abdicate all responsibility for their crimes.